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1. Introduction
Under traditional health insurance arrangements, citizens were covered by some insur-
ance scheme. When sick, insurance arrangements allowed citizens to go to a health care 
provider, pay the price of the care received and be reimbursed later. Alternatively, the 
care provider would be owned by the insurer (like in integrated national health systems) 
and the patient paid nothing at the moment of consumption. In such arrangements, pro-
viders would freely set their prices or have no price to set at all (in an NHS- like system).
Recent developments in health care financing include independent institutions that 
negotiate the prices with the financing institution. This is true with respect to health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs), managed care in general, but also in national 
health systems where decentralization and the split between provision and financing is 
implemented.
In this scenario, negotiation over contractual terms, including prices as one major 
element, becomes a relevant issue in the analysis of performance of health care systems. 
Both empirical and theoretical analyses have been produced, and are reviewed below.
This chapter reflects our views and preferences. It does not aim to be an encyclopaedic 
view of the existing literature on bargaining in health care. Instead, we try to highlight 
the new developments associated with explicit bargaining between third- party payers 
and providers of health care (a relation which is, in itself, only one of many that exist in 
the health care sector).
Bargaining theory has a long tradition in the economics literature. However, it is only 
recently that this approach has found space in the analysis of the health care sector. The 
recognition of the strategic interaction among agents in the health care sector (patients, 
providers and third- party payers) came with the application of models borrowed from 
the industrial organization tradition dating from the 1970s. It was in the early 1990s 
when a step forward was taken with the eruption of the models of bargaining (see for 
example, Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990, for a nice presentation) In many situations the 
health care sector has the structure of a bilateral monopoly/oligopoly. In this context, 
bargaining becomes the natural way to approach the interactions among agents.
Most economic analyses of contract design in health care in fact assume that the party 
that moves first, typically the payer, proposes a take- it- or- leave- it offer to the provider. 
We take here a broader view, looking at other types of negotiation procedures. We 
do not discuss issues related to contract design, which are taken up in chapter 22 by 
Chalkley in this Companion.
We focus here on models of explicit bargaining between two parties, which we call 
the payer and the provider. On theoretical grounds, simple bargaining models can have 
their results transposed in a straightforward way: higher bargaining power and higher 
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alternative- option values (‘outside options’) from providers generate higher prices. 
Therefore, a first empirical question is: how strong are providers? In other words, financ-
ing institutions (payers) are usually large relative to providers. However, providers 
may in turn have natural exclusive ‘catchment areas’ (in geographic terms or medical 
specialty), thus balancing the negotiation strength. Then, what is the effect on prices 
from moving to an explicit bargaining situation? This being a relevant question, it is 
certainly not the only one. The special setting of health care markets brings to attention 
the optimal design of the negotiation procedure. In particular, the timing and format of 
negotiations between payers/financing institutions and health care providers may lead to 
distinct outcomes.
We discuss first the main theoretical background, emphasizing recent work. 
Afterwards, we review some of the ‘small’ empirical literature on bargaining in health 
care. We conclude with directions for future research.
2. Models of bargaining in health
The basic model has a single third- party payer bargaining with a single provider over the 
division of a surplus S. The Nash bargaining solution is a price p* that maximizes the 
product of their gains weighted by the respective bargaining powers. Formally,
 p* 5 argmaxpV(p) dP (p) 12d (21.1)
where V(p)  is the surplus for the third- party payer (V r (p) , 0), P (p)  is the profit for 
the provider (P r (p) . 0), and d is a parameter related to the relative bargaining power 
of the third- party payer. Whenever the total surplus S 5 V(p) 1 P (p)  is constant, the 
Nash bargaining solution entails
 V(p*) 5 dS (21.2)
Thus, the greater the bargaining power of the third- party payer, the greater the share of 
surplus they capture. This simple model does not allow for outside options (the result 
of the non- cooperative game should the players fail to reach an agreement). The Nash 
bargaining solution has been extended to the situation where the parties have an alter-
native in case of breakdown of negotiations. Suppose that the third- party payer has an 
alternative value of V  and the provider has a profit P when negotiations fail. Then, the 
generalized Nash bargaining solution corresponds to
 p* 5 argmaxp (V(p) 2 V) d (P (p) 2 P) 12d (21.3)
Taking again the case of a fixed total surplus, S, the Nash bargaining outcome implies:
 V(p*) 5 V 1 d (S 2 P 2 V)  (21.4)
That is, the third- party payer is assured of its outside option value, V, plus a share 
d of the total surplus at stake, given by the overall surplus S, deducted from the 
assured outside option values to each side, Vand P. These outside option values also 
drive the outcome of the bargaining process. In particular, the higher the outside value 
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of the third- party payer (the provider), the lower (the higher) the equilibrium price 
will be.
The Nash bargaining solution is the only solution satisfying a set of four intuitively 
appealing properties. These are: efficiency, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alter-
natives, and invariance to equivalent utility representations. In the application of this 
concept to health care context, the patient who can only be given a small health improve-
ment will receive less of the health care budget than a patient with potential to achieve 
a large health improvement. A useful illustration supporting this solution and other 
alternatives can be found in Cuadras- Morato et al. (2001).
The empirical papers reviewed below can be interpreted in this simple framework, 
as they attempt to identify the sources of bargaining power of the third- party payer 
and of the provider, or the impact of increasing V  and/or decreasing P. The theoreti-
cal works by Gal- Or (1997, 1999a, 1999b), Barros and Martinez- Giralt (2005a, 2005b, 
2008), Milliou et al. (2003) and Fingleton and Raith (2005) elaborate on this bargaining 
model by providing more structure, mainly to functions V(.) , P (.)  and V, P. The par-
ticular market structures assumed to contextualize the bargaining process allow for the 
discussion of different aspects. These are the impact of (i) product differentiation across 
providers and (ii) mergers between providers in the outside values. Gal- Or (1999b) and 
Milliou et al. (2003) discuss the role of vertical mergers between hospitals and physician 
practices in increasing the bargaining power of the latter vis- à- vis third- party payers. In 
Gal- Or (1997, 1999a), Barros and Martinez- Giralt (2005a, 2005b, 2008) and Fingleton 
and Raith (2005), the interest is in the way the bargaining is organized, which originates 
different values for these parameters, discussed below.
The next logical step is, in our view, to use the bargaining model to discuss the particu-
lar institutional arrangement for bargaining. We focus on price negotiations. Siciliani 
and Stanciole (2008) broaden the scope of the negotiation to process and activity. Two 
sorts of choices seem relevant to consider. The first is the choice between the bargaining 
game and the use of ‘any willing provider’ (AWP) clauses. These require payers to take 
into their networks of providers all those willing to accept the terms and conditions of 
the contract (price, quality, licensing). Also, in some European countries (for example, 
Switzerland or the UK) we can find the use of AWP dispositions. The second is the 
choice between negotiating with each provider on a one- to- one basis and negotiating 
with an association of providers.
Both institutional arrangements can be found in practice. The AWP approach has 
been debated mainly in the United States, where the enactment of AWP laws by some 
states (for example, Kentucky in 2003) were taken to the Supreme Court and upheld. 
Simon (1997) studies the effect of AWP laws on managed care penetration rates and 
provider participation, and Ohsfeldt et al. (1998) explore the growth of AWP laws 
applicable to managed care firms and the determinants of their enactment. Empirical 
work on the implications of the ‘any willing provider’ laws by Carroll and Ambrose 
(2002), Morrisey and Oshfeldt (2004) and Vita (2001), have been complemented by 
the novel theoretical treatment of Barros and Martinez- Giralt (2008). We address the 
question of how a third- party payer (for example, an insurer) decides what providers 
to contract with under the AWP mechanism and under a bargaining procedure. The 
main finding is that the decision of the third- party payer depends on the surplus to be 
shared. When it is relatively high the third- party payer prefers the any willing provider 
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system. This is so because the announcement of the terms of the contract constitutes 
an implicit commitment to be tough. This commitment is more valuable in the case of 
a bigger surplus. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third- party 
payer will select a negotiated solution. This imposes further demands on empirical work 
related to the impact of such laws. It also raises econometric issues: countries, states or 
third- party payers may introduce them because they fulfil the conditions to get lower 
prices that way. This endogeneity issue has not yet been tackled in empirical work, to 
our knowledge.
As to the second issue dealing with the convenience of bargaining with an association, 
we do find in several European countries examples of centralized negotiations between 
third- party payers (National Health Services, Health Plans or Insurers) and associations 
of providers. This question also extends beyond the NHS framework. Around 2005, in 
the US there was an attempt by democrats in the state Senate and Assembly to pass a 
bill that would allow health care providers to bargain collectively with health care plans. 
Barros and Martinez- Giralt (2005b) show that a third- party payer may prefer to deal 
with a professional association than with the sub- set constituted by the more efficient 
providers (able to cope with lower prices), and then apply the same price to all provid-
ers. The reason for this is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more 
efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. 
This allows them to extract a higher surplus from the third- party payer. From a differ-
ent perspective, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 expanded Medicare allowing 
private insurers to negotiate drug prices and rebates with retail pharmacies and drug 
manufacturers, rather than having Medicare negotiate a single price on behalf of all 
beneficiaries. Lakdawalla and Yin (2009) find that greater concentration among private 
insurers allows them to obtain lower prices for their members.
In this respect, the general literature on bargaining, mostly with applications to the 
labour market, provides rationales for providers to join forces and to negotiate as a 
single entity vis- à- vis the third- party payer. The direct application of most bargaining 
theory results to health care settings faces a difficulty: the existence of market interac-
tion between participants on one side of the negotiation (the provider). This often makes, 
in health care, the value of one negotiation conditional on the outcome of some other 
(simultaneous) negotiation(s). Firm–union bargaining issues have similarities, allowing 
for useful analogies to health care settings. For example, see Gal- Or’s (1997) study into 
the way third- party payers select providers to contract with. She considers two differ-
entiated providers and finds that when consumers’ valuation of accessing a full set of 
providers is small (large) relative to the degree of differentiation between payers, both 
payers choose to contract with only one (both) of the providers. Petrakis and Vlassis 
(2000) provide a model of endogenous determination of the firm–union bargaining. 
According to the relative bargaining power of the unions, they choose to negotiate over 
wages only or over wages and employment as well. Barros and Martinez- Giralt (2005a) 
note that a feature present in countries with a National Health Service is the co- existence 
of a public and a private sector. Often, the public payer contracts with private providers 
while holding idle capacity. We argue that the public sector may opt to have idle capacity 
as a way to gain bargaining power vis- à- vis the private provider, under the assumption of 
a more efficient private than public sector.
Chae and Heidues (2004) point out that when studying negotiations within and across 
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groups, it is essential to define the preferences of the group. Their analysis provides a 
theoretical foundation for treating groups as single decision- makers and generalizes the 
Nash bargaining model. Cai (2004) studies the bargaining structure of a game of com-
plete information where a player bargains sequentially with a number of passive players 
to implement a project. It turns out that in equilibrium, the probability of the project 
getting implemented decreases with the number of passive players and their bargain-
ing power. Finally, Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b) and Wolinsky (2000) examine the 
effects of union bargaining on employment and other organizational design issues. This 
line of research is also related to other work, namely by Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and 
Inderst and Wey (2003). They show that as each supplier acts on the incremental surplus, 
under decreasing surplus function, doubling the incremental surplus is smaller than the 
entire surplus, which provides an incentive for providers to join forces and gain bargain-
ing power in input markets.
However, at least equally relevant is to know under which circumstances the third- 
party payer itself prefers to bargain with an association, or not. This will depend on the 
change in the outside option value for providers. Barros and Martinez- Giralt (2005b) 
show that by negotiating with an association, the third- party payer dilutes the outside 
option value of the more efficient providers. The more efficient providers are the ones 
that have more to gain from a bilateral bargaining process. The change in their bargain-
ing power, measured by the outside option value can more than compensate for the 
willingness to take up lower prices due to higher efficiency.
A different line of research proposed by Jelovac (2002) studies the financing of phar-
maceutical products in a national health system where negotiations between the public 
financing agency and pharmaceutical laboratories are affected by the conditions on the 
demand side, in particular, by the level of co- payments. Also Wright (2004) contributes 
to this discussion, focusing on the Australian regulation system for drug introduction, 
and the price bargaining process for new drugs. The regulated pharmaceutical firms 
manage to extract more of the total additional surplus generated by regulation, thus 
achieving greater pay- offs than in the absence of regulation.
3. Evidence on bargaining outcomes
Even though explicit negotiations exist in countries with national health services (like the 
UK and Canada) and with private insurance- oriented systems (like the United States), a 
crucial difference can be found: in national health services, negotiations often take place 
between third- party payers (the government or health plans) and professional associa-
tions (like medical associations). This sets the negotiation in terms of bilateral monopoly. 
On the other hand, health maintenance organizations, like the ones that emerged in the 
United States, use negotiations with providers in a competitive setting. The third- party 
payer uses the outside option it has, looking for an alternative provider, to put pressure 
upon providers and obtain lower prices.
There is a recent line of literature looking at the empirical impact of negotiation proc-
esses between providers and insurers/third- party payers of health care. The first empirical 
issue addressed is whether managed care organizations are able to obtain advantageous 
conditions through bargaining. The debate has one side claiming that lower costs asso-
ciated with managed care are the outcome of quality degradation, while the other side 
claims that lower costs are due to the ability of managed care organizations to obtain 
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lower prices from providers. The existing evidence favours the latter interpretation over 
the former (see, among others, Cuellar and Gertler, 2006; Cutler et al., 2000; Ho, 2004; 
Maude- Griffin et al., 2001, Melnick et al., 1992; Sieg (2000)).
Also in the UK NHS, changes in bargaining power seem to have produced visible 
effects. One of the main policy experiments in the UK, the fundholding GPs (GPs who 
handle their own budgets), implied an important shift of bargaining power towards 
GPs, especially those that were fundholders. The empirical research looking at hospital 
discrimination (favouritism for patients associated with fundholders) can also be used to 
address the impact of bargaining power shifts. According to Propper et al. (2002), the 
fundholding GPs were able to obtain lower waiting times for their patients. The ability 
of GP fundholders to channel money is a reinforcement of their bargaining position 
vis- à- vis hospitals, and prompted better conditions for the patients of GP fundholders. 
Thus, understanding ‘time’ as a sort of price in a health system where monetary prices are 
administratively fixed, the increased bargaining power of GPs, created by the different 
institutional arrangement (fundholding), has lowered the price/time paid (as a side note, 
concerns over risk selection issues led to the elimination of the fundholding system to be 
substituted by primary care groups).
Since lower prices are obtained by payers, a second empirical question arises: the 
source of the bargaining power of insurers and providers. Theory suggests that size and 
the existence of outside options do increase a side’s bargaining strength. The studies on 
the sources of bargaining power in health care can be divided into two lines: one looking 
at the bargaining power of third- party payers; the other one detailing the bargaining 
power of providers, usually hospitals. On the latter line of empirical research, Brooks et 
al. (1997, 1998) and Town and Vistnes (2001) look at hospital competition and owner-
ship type as sources of bargaining power. Their findings conform well to what we should 
expect (see above): competition between hospitals to attract health plans and patients 
reduces their bargaining power, and lower prices are observed. Moreover, the increased 
HMO penetration over time was associated with a decrease in hospitals’ bargaining 
power.
With respect to third- party payers, the available evidence suggests that availability of 
alternatives is a more significant source of bargaining power than size alone. Availability 
of alternatives means, for health care third- party payers, the ability to channel patients 
to different providers. Studies by Ellison and Snyder (2001), Pauly (1998), Sorensen 
(2003), Staten et al. (1988) and Wu (2009) give empirical support to this view. Pauly 
(1998) noted that size did not preclude small managed care organizations from obtaining 
significant discounts from hospitals. Sorensen (2003) takes a step further and finds that 
the ability of third- party payers to direct patients to designated providers has a greater 
impact than size. Wu (2009) finds that demand elasticity (measured by the patient chan-
nelling within the provider network) is even more important than size for the health 
plans to obtain discounts.
It should also be apparent that some of the theoretical testable predictions are yet to 
be taken to the data.
4. Directions for future research
Health economics has radically changed its ‘toolbox’ in the last 25 years. It was the rec-
ognition of the strategic behaviour of the agents interacting in the health care sector that 
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brought the view of the industrial organization field into the analysis. More recently, 
since the mid- 1990s, an explicit recognition of the particular interactions between the 
different types of players (patients, providers and third- party payers) has introduced 
bargaining theory among the tools of analysis. We have attempted here to provide an 
overview of the problems tackled so far. Although bargaining theory is widely devel-
oped, the health care sector contains enough peculiarities to prevent a direct application 
of the results already obtained in other sectors, such as, for example, the labour market. 
Although some efforts to apply bargaining theory to the analysis of the health care sector 
have already been done, several issues still require intense research efforts.
One relevant dimension is the timing of the negotiation, especially when the payer has 
to deal with several providers. Then, it may choose to negotiate simultaneously with all 
interested providers, to do it sequentially (each provider at a time) or to use mechanisms 
like ‘any willing provider’ clauses. These alternative scenarios have clear implications 
for the modelling of the information available to the negotiating parties. Also, one 
should take into account that asymmetric information in negotiation games may reveal 
information.
The protocol of the bargaining game also has consequences for the capacity of the 
third- party payer to dilute the bargaining power of providers and thus to bias the 
outcome of the negotiation. This may, obviously, lead to policy- relevant insights. Along 
these lines, we can put forward a counter- intuitive conjecture based on Barros and 
Martinez- Giralt (2005b). This is that allowing entry by efficient providers can be harmful 
if negotiations are not done under the auspices of an association.
Another issue that, up to our knowledge, has not yet been fully treated is the bar-
gaining over price and (observable) quality. This implies a multi- dimensional bar-
gaining problem. A first step, in the context of drug prices, can be found in Wright 
(2004), though quality is assessed and not subject to negotiation, in the process of price 
determination.
Many of the relevant relations between third- party payers and providers are repeated 
ones, and often bargaining occurs repeatedly over time. How this repeated nature 
does (or does not) change the bargaining outcome in health care provision is yet to be 
discussed.
We also feel that empirical analysis of bargaining outcomes in European countries is 
also warranted, as they occur mostly in the context of bilateral monopoly, with provid-
ers organized in professional associations. Of course, we are aware that gathering the 
relevant information will be a formidable task.
Last but not least, in a somewhat different direction a recent trend in the organization 
of the health care sector is given by the so- called private finance initiatives (PFI), par-
ticularly in the UK, Portugal and other countries. The implementation of these public–
private partnership programmes demands a careful negotiation leading to the contract 
design, and the definition of what is included in the contract of one entity and what 
remains to the other one. A first analysis along this line is found in Barros and Martinez- 
Giralt (2009). Also, Martimort and colleagues (Martimort and Iossa, 2009; Martimort et 
al., 2008) apply principal agent models to PPPs in the transport sector.
Overall, the spreading of instances of explicit bargaining/negotiations between third- 
party payers and providers should lead to the need of both positive and normative theo-
retical approaches and further empirical work.
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